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Traditional pre-publication peer review of scientific output is a slow, inefficient, and
unreliable process. Efforts to replace or supplement traditional evaluation models with
open evaluation platforms that leverage advances in information technology are slowly
gaining traction, but remain in the early stages of design and implementation. Here I
discuss a number of considerations relevant to the development of such platforms. I focus
particular attention on three core elements that next-generation evaluation platforms
should strive to emphasize, including (1) open and transparent access to accumulated
evaluation data, (2) personalized and highly customizable performance metrics, and (3)
appropriate short-term incentivization of the userbase. Because all of these elements
have already been successfully implemented on a large scale in hundreds of existing
social web applications, I argue that development of new scientific evaluation platforms
should proceed largely by adapting existing techniques rather than engineering entirely
new evaluation mechanisms. Successful implementation of open evaluation platforms has
the potential to substantially advance both the pace and the quality of scientific publication
and evaluation, and the scientific community has a vested interest in shifting toward such
models as soon as possible.
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Archimedes is widely considered one of the greatest mathemati-
cians and scientists of antiquity. Yet he lived during a period
of history (the third century BC) not known for meticulous
record keeping, and our appreciation of his seminal contribu-
tions consequently depends largely on good fortune. Because of
his correspondence with the scholars Conon and Dositheus at
the library of Alexandria, we now know of his seminal contribu-
tions to geometry and mechanics—work that formed the basis
of numerous engineering advances and mathematical discoveries
in subsequent centuries (Heath, 1897; Chondros, 2010a,b). But
any numbers of slight deviations in the course of history—say, a
crucial letter lost at sea, or a librarian’s decision to reuse one of
Archimedes’ palimpsests—could have resulted in the permanent
loss of his seminal works (and indeed, a number have never been
recovered). In Archimedes’ time, and through most of modern
human history, the rate of scientific and technological progress
depended not just on who discovered what, but also on how good
people were at preserving knowledge of what they discovered for
future generations. And since record keeping was a difficult busi-
ness that involved allocation of limited resources, progress also
depended heavily on the scholarly community’s collective ability
to accurately determine which work was worth keeping around
for posterity.
Modern technology has now solved the problem of preser-
vation; contemporary scientists can rest assured that virtually
every scientific article published today will exist in digital form
in perpetuity. One might intuitively expect that this alleviation
of the preservation bottleneck would also eliminate the selection
problem; after all, if it costs virtually nothing to publish and pre-
serve, why bother to suppress a scientific manuscript that could
be useful to someone else down the line, however, improbable the
odds? Yet in many respects, the scientific community still behaves
as though record keeping were a difficult enterprise and paper a
scarce commodity. We spend months waiting to hear back from
reviewers at journals with 90% rejection rates, anguishing over
the prospect that our work might not see the light of day, even
though we could disseminate our manuscript to the whole world
at any moment via the web. We rely heavily on a select few indi-
viduals to pass judgment on our work, even though dozens or
hundreds of other researchers are likely to form an informed
opinion of its merits within days of official publication. And while
we wait for the reviews to come in, we silently fret over the possi-
bility that we might be “scooped” by someone else, even though
all it takes to establish scientific precedence is one timestamped
upload in a preprint repository.
The continued reliance on an anachronistic publication and
evaluation model is striking given the widespread awareness of
its many limitations (Smith, 2006; Casati et al., 2007; Jefferson
et al., 2007; Young et al., 2008; Ioannidis et al., 2010). Many
scientists seem all too happy to move away from the current pub-
lishing model and adopt an alternative model that emphasizes
open access and “crowdsourced” evaluation. But progress toward
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such a goal has been relatively slow. While preprint servers such
as arXiv.org have attained near universal usage in some disci-
plines, such platforms provide few if any tools for evaluation of
manuscripts. Conversely, the few platforms that do allow users
to evaluate manuscripts post-publication (e.g., the Public Library
of Science’s platform; http://plos.org) have a restricted scope and
limited userbase (e.g., analysis of publicly available usage statis-
tics indicate that as of this writing, PLoS articles have received an
average of 0.06 ratings and 0.15 comments; http://www.plosone.
org/static/almInfo.action).
Understandably, norms take time to change; what’s surprising
is perhaps not that scientists still rely on publishing and eval-
uation models developed centuries ago, but that they do so in
the face of available alternatives. While the scientific commu-
nity has been slow to embrace emerging information technology,
that technology has itself evolved very quickly, and now sup-
ports tens of thousands of websites featuring a prominent social
component—what has come to be known as the social web.
In many respects, the challenges faced by popular social web
applications—spanning everything from Amazon to Netflix to
reddit to Last.fm–closely resemble those involved in evaluating
scientific work: How can we combine disparate ratings from peo-
ple with very different backgrounds and interests into a single
summary of an item’s quality? How do we motivate users to
engage with the platform and contribute their evaluations? What
steps should we take to prevent people from gaming the system?
And can we provide customized evaluations tailored to individual
users rather than the userbase as a whole?
In the rest of this paper, I discuss a number of principles that
should guide the implementation of novel platforms for evaluat-
ing scientific work. The overarching argument is that many of the
problems scientists face have already been successfully addressed
by social web applications, and developing next-generation plat-
forms for scientific evaluations should be more a matter of adapt-
ing the best currently used approaches than of innovating entirely
new ones (cf. Neylon and Wu, 2009; Priem and Hemminger,
2010). Indeed, virtually all of the suggestions I will make have,
in one form or another, already been successfully implemented
somewhere on the web—often in a great many places.
I begin by briefly reviewing the limitations of the current
publishing and evaluation model. I argue that since a transition
away from this model is inevitable, and is already in progress, it
behooves us to give serious thought to the kinds of platforms we
would like to see built in the near future—and increase our efforts
to implement such platforms. I then spend the bulk of the article
focusing on three general principles we should strive to realize:
openness and transparency, customizability and personalization,
and appropriate incentivization. Finally, I conclude with a con-
sideration of some potential criticisms and concerns associated
with the prospect of a wholesale change in the way the scientific
community evaluates research output.
LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT PRACTICE
Although the focus of the present article and others in this col-
lection is on constructive ideas for new scientific evaluation plat-
forms rather than on critiques of existing models, a brief review
of some major limitations of current evaluation practices will
provide a useful backdrop for subsequent discussion of alternative
approaches. These limitations include the following.
SLOWNESS AND INEFFICIENCY
Most articles that eventually get published in peer-reviewed jour-
nals go through several cycles of revision and re-review—often at
different journals. Typically, months or years elapse between the
initial submission and official publication of a manuscript (Ray,
2000; Ellison, 2002; Hall and Wilcox, 2007; Kravitz and Baker,
2011). Most of that time is spent passively waiting rather than
actively revising or reviewing; authors have to wait for editors,
editors have to wait for the slowest reviewer, and when a paper is
rejected, everyone has to wait for the authors to revise and resub-
mit the manuscript to a different journal. There’s no principled
justification for such delays and inefficiencies; they simply fall out
of current publishing models, with many journals having to reject
the vast majority of submissions received in order to preserve a
reputation for quality and selectivity. Improving the speed and
efficiency of the review process could potentially have a dramatic
impact on the rate of scientific progress.
OPACITY
Because the peer review process is typically conducted behind
closed doors, most reviews leave no cumulative record for other
scientists to peruse, and allow no independent evaluation of the
reviews or reviewers themselves. The problem with lack of trans-
parency is that the quality of reviews is highly variable, frequently
leading to rejection of articles for spurious reasons (see below).
Unfortunately, under the current model, consumers have no way
to evaluate the process that led up to a final decision, or to review
any of the interactions between authors, reviewers, and editors.
This opacity increases the likelihood of incorrect judgments about
a paper’s merits, and runs completely counter to the cumulative
and open nature of the scientific enterprise. If we don’t know
who said what about a manuscript and how the manuscript’s
authors responded, we run a high risk of overlooking or repeating
potentially important mistakes.
LOW RELIABILITY
Current evaluation practices might be defensible if there were
empirical evidence that such practices achieve their goals; but for-
mal studies consistently suggest that conventional pre-publication
peer review is of limited utility in establishing the quality of
manuscripts (though it is undeniably better than no peer review
at all). A recent random-effects meta-analysis of 48 studies, com-
prising 19,443 manuscripts, estimated an inter-rater intra-class
correlation of only 0.34 (Bornmann et al., 2010). Since most arti-
cles are evaluated by only two or three reviewers prior to publi-
cation, and editorial decisions typically follow those of reviewers,
it follows that many decisions to accept or reject a manuscript
are not appreciably better than chance. This point is corrob-
orated by the grossly uneven distribution of citation rates for
articles published in top journals such as Nature and Science
(which explicitly select articles on the basis of perceived impact): a
minority of articles typically account for the vast majority of cita-
tions, and a sizeable proportion of published articles receive few
or no citations (Seglen, 1997; Dong et al., 2005; Mayor, 2010).
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While citation counts are not a direct measure of paper qual-
ity, there is little reason to suppose that journal impact factor
predicts other metrics or expert judgments any better. To the
contrary, retrospective evaluations have found modest or no cor-
relations between journal impact factor and expert ratings of
impact or quality (Bath et al., 1998; West and McIlwaine, 2002;
Maier, 2006; Sutherland et al., 2011). Such findings imply that
the heavy emphasis scientists often place on “high-impact” pub-
lications when evaluating other researchers’ work is likely to be
misplaced.
LACK OF INCENTIVES
Reviewing scientific manuscripts is time-consuming and effort-
ful. Unfortunately, peer reviewers have relatively little incentive
to do a good job. Outside of a sense of duty to one’s profes-
sion and peers, and perhaps a pragmatic desire to curry favor
with editors, scientists have little to gain by volunteering their
time as reviewers, let alone by turning in high-quality reviews
on time (Mahoney, 1977; Hojat et al., 2003). Indeed, in some
cases, reviewers may even have incentives to write bad reviews—
for instance, when a researcher is asked to evaluate a competitor’s
manuscript. There’s no doubt that the vast majority of scien-
tists will do the right thing in such cases; but it surely seems like
bad policy to rely on a system that depends almost entirely on
communal goodwill. An ideal evaluation model would directly
incentivize the behaviors that maximize the success of the scien-
tific enterprise as a whole, and conversely, would actively deter
those that threaten the quality or efficiency of that enterprise.
A TRANSITION IS INEVITABLE
The limitations reviewed above exist for good reasons, of course.
But those reasons are almost entirely historical. When papers were
published exclusively in print and scientific communication took
place via the postal service, it made sense to restrict publication
to a minority of papers that passed some perceived litmus test for
quality. But such constraints don’t apply in an age of electronic
communication, open access repositories, and collaborative fil-
tering algorithms. Now that the marginal cost of replicating and
disseminating manuscripts has dropped to essentially nothing, it
makes little sense to artificially restrict the availability or flow of
scientific information. There’s a continued need for quality con-
trol, of course; but that can be achieved using “soft” filtering
approaches that dynamically emphasize or deemphasize infor-
mation ad hoc. It doesn’t require destructive approaches that
permanently remove a large part of relevant data from the record.
If Archimedes in his day had had the option of instantly deposit-
ing his work in arXiv, it’s doubtful that anyone today would accuse
him of wasting a few bytes. It’s relatively easy to ignore informa-
tion we don’t need, but not so easy to recreate information that
no longer exists.
One might argue that flooding the scientific literature with
papers that have received little or no prior scrutiny would result
in information overload and make it impossible to separate good
research from bad. But whatever the merit of this argument (and
I argue below that it has little), it seems clear at this point that the
ship has already sailed. With a modest amount of persistence, sci-
entists can now place virtually any manuscript in a peer-reviewed
journal somewhere (Chew, 1991; Ray, 2000; Hall and Wilcox,
2007)—and often in well-respected venues. For instance, PLoS
ONE, the world’s largest journal, published over 7000 articles
in 2010, spanning nearly all domains of science, and accepted
approximately 70% of all submissions (http://www.plosone.org/
static/review.action). This model appears so financially success-
ful that Nature Publishing Group and SAGE have both recently
launched their own competing open-access, broad-scope jour-
nals (Scientific Reports and SAGE Open). To put it bluntly,
between megajournals like PLoS ONE and thousands of special-
ized second- and third-tier journals, we already are publishing
virtually everything. But we’re doing it very slowly and ineffi-
ciently. So the real question is no longer whether or not the
scientific community should transition to an open publishing
model (Harnad, 1999; Shadbolt et al., 2006); it’s how to handle the
inevitable flood of information most efficiently and productively.
Our current approach is to rely on heuristics of dubious value—
e.g., journal impact factors. But there are far better technological
solutions available. The rest of this article discusses a series of
principles scientists should strive to respect when implement-
ing new platform and that have already been implemented with
great success in many social web applications that face similar
evaluation challenges.
OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY
To combat the opacity of the current peer review system, open-
ness and transparency should be central design features of any
next-generation scientific evaluation platform. In this context,
openness doesn’t just mean making reviews of papers accessible
online; it implies a fundamental level of transparency and data
accessibility that should reside at the very core of new platforms.
Multiple layers of information—including nearly all the data
amassed by that platform over time—should be freely available
and programmatically accessible to interested parties.
OPEN ACCESS TO (NEARLY) ALL CONTENT
Arguably the single most important desideratum for a next-
generation evaluation platform is providing open access to the
reviews, comments, and ratings of manuscripts generated at all
stages of the evaluation process. Setting aside for the moment
the question of whether reviewers should be forced to disclose
their identities (see below), there is little reason to withhold the
content of reviews and ratings from the public—at least in aggre-
gate form (e.g., providing the mean ra ting of each manuscript).
Making evaluations openly accessible would have several sub-
stantial benefits. First, it would allow researchers to evaluate the
evaluators; that is, researchers would be able to determine the
quality of the reviews that influence the reception of an article,
and adjust that reception accordingly. Unscrupulous researchers
would, for instance, no longer have the power to reject competi-
tors’ work by providing excessively negative reviews, since those
reviews would themselves be subject to evaluation. Second, when
implemented on a sufficiently large-scale, an open database of
evaluations would provide a centralized forum for discussion of
scientific work, which currently occurs in a piecemeal and much
less efficient fashion elsewhere online and offline. Third, open
access to reviews would allow researchers to receive credit for
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evaluating others’ work, and hence provide greater incentive to
participate in peer review.
All three of these principles are already embodied in many
existing community-oriented websites. One particularly effective
example is implemented on the popular social news website red-
dit (reddit.com), which features threaded conversations that allow
users to comment and vote on both original submissions and
other users’ comments. Submissions and comments can then be
sorted in a variety of ways (e.g., by top score, novelty, by amount
of controversy, etc.). The result is a highly efficient collaborative
filtering system (Schafer et al., 2007) that rapidly differentiates
between high- and low-quality submissions. Moreover, the com-
ments exert a strong influence on the reception of the original
submissions; inmany cases, an astute comment or two (e.g., when
critical questions are raised about the veracity of information pro-
vided in a link) leads to rapid adjustment of a submission’s score.
And since comments are themselves subject to evaluation, the
process is iterative and encourages genuine discussion between
users with differing opinions. The net result is an openly acces-
sible record of (mostly) intelligent debate over everything from
YouTube videos to government bills to old photographs. The
same type of open discussion model could potentially greatly
facilitate evaluation of scientific manuscripts.
TRANSPARENT IDENTITIES
While there appear to be few downsides to making the con-
tent of reviews and ratings openly and easily accessible within a
post-publication framework, the question of whether to force dis-
closure of reviewers’ identities is a more delicate one. There’s a
common perception that peer reviewers would refuse to review
papers if forced to disclose their identities, and that anonymous
reviews are a necessary evil if we want researchers to express
their true views about manuscripts (Fabiato, 1994; Ware, 2007;
Baggs et al., 2008). This perception appears to be unfounded
inasmuch as empirical studies suggest that forcing reviewers to
disclose their identities to authors and/or readers only modestly
increases refusal rates while improving the tone of reviews and
leaving their overall quality unaltered (Justice et al., 1998; van
Rooyen et al., 1998; Walsh et al., 2000; van Rooyen et al., 2010).
Moreover, one can legitimately question whether anonymity cur-
rently allows reviewers to go to the opposite extreme, expressing
excessively negative or unfair views that the light of day might
otherwise moderate.
Nonetheless, privacy concerns deserve to be taken seriously.
We can distinguish between technical and sociological questions
related to identity disclosure. From a technical standpoint, the
principle is clear: any evaluation platform should build in tools
that allow users a range of privacy management options, ranging
from full disclosure of identity (including real names, institu-
tional affiliations, etc.) to pseudonymous or entirely anonymous
posting. The sociological question will then arise as to how much
transparency of identity is desirable, and how to best motivate
that degree of disclosure. A strong case can be made that some
data should remain private by default (except in the aggregate);
for instance, it would probably be a bad idea to force public
display of users’ ratings of individual articles. While greater trans-
parency may generally be a good thing, we shouldn’t let the
perfect be an enemy of the good: if the only way to encourage
widespread adoption of a next-generation evaluation platform
is to allow pseudonymity or anonymity that seems preferable to
building an idealistic platform that no one wants to use. And as
I discuss in more detail below, there is good reason to believe
that given a well-structured reputationmanagement system, most
users would voluntarily opt to disclose their identities.
PUBLIC APIs
Application programming interfaces (APIs) play a central role in
modern web applications. Public APIs allow third-party devel-
opers and users to plot custom bicycle routes on Google Maps,
to “mashup” different YouTube videos, and to integrate Twitter
streams into their own websites and applications. API-based
access to the data generated by a successful scientific evaluation
platform would facilitate the development of novel third-party
applications, in turn spurring greater adoption of a platform
and promoting further innovation. Given a platform that aggre-
gates citation data, ratings, reviews, and comments for every
paper in PubMed, and makes such data accessible via API, third
party developers could build a broad range of applications—
for instance, article recommendation tools (“users who liked this
paper also liked these ones. . .”), specialized aggregators that selec-
tively highlight a subset of articles defined by some common
interest, and customizable evaluation metrics that allow users to
generate their own weighting schemes for quantitative assessment
of articles, journals, researchers, or institutions.
Although the deployment and adoption of research-related
APIs is still in early stages, several services have already begun
to provide public API access to their data. Notable examples
are the Public Library of Science (PLoS) API (http://api.plos.
org), which provides access to article-level metrics (e.g., page
views and downloads) for tens of thousands of PLoS articles,
and the Mendeley API (http://dev.mendeley.com), which pro-
vides programmatic access to a crowdsourced research database
of over 100 million articles and growing. An explicit goal of these
APIs—and in the case of Mendeley, of an accompanying release
of usage data for nearly 5 million papers (http://dev.mendeley.
com/datachallenge)—is to support development of new research
tools such as article recommendation systems (discussed in the
next section). These releases represent only the beginning of what
promises to be a deluge of publicly accessible data relevant to the
evaluation of scientific output.
PERSONALIZATION AND CUSTOMIZABILITY
There was a time not too long ago when people decided what
movies to watch, or what music to listen to, largely on the basis
of consensus opinion and/or the authoritative recommendation
of a third party. While such factors still play an important role
in our choice of media, they have, in many cases, been super-
seded by social web applications explicitly designed to provide
personalized recommendations based on each individual’s prior
history and preferences. Sophisticated recommendation systems
at the heart of many of the web’s most popular sites (e.g., Netflix,
Amazon, Last.fm, and Google News) now provide nearly effort-
less ways to identify new products and services we (as opposed
to other people) are likely to enjoy (for review, see Adomavicius
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and Tuzhilin, 2005; Pazzani and Billsus, 2007; Schafer et al., 2007).
The revolutionary impact of such systems lies in their recognition
that what people predominantly care about is how much they like
a product. Other people’s evaluations, while informative, are gen-
erally helpful only to the extent that they provide a reasonable
proxy for one’s own preferences.
Broadly speaking, recommendation systems come in two fla-
vors. Collaborative filtering approaches rely on user-provided
ratings to generate recommendations (Schafer et al., 2007). Make
a few 5-point ratings on Netflix, and you’ll start receiving sug-
gestions for movies that similar users liked; view a product
on Amazon, and it’ll try to sell you related products others
have bought. Content-based approaches rely on objective cod-
ing of different aspects of a product or service in order to
identify similar items (Pazzani and Billsus, 2007). For exam-
ple, the Pandora music service bases its recommendations on
expert ratings of hundreds of thousands of songs (Casey et al.,
2008). Empirical studies demonstrate that both collaborative fil-
tering and content-based recommendation systems—as well as
many hybrid approaches—are capable of accurately predicting
user preferences across a broad range of domains, including
commercial products (Pathak et al., 2010; Sarwar et al., 2000),
movies (Miller et al., 2003; Bennett and Lanning, 2007), news
articles (Phelan et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010), leisure activities
(Ducheneaut et al., 2009), and musical tastes (Yoshii et al., 2008;
Barrington et al., 2009).
In principle, the scientific community could use similar fil-
tering approaches to evaluate scientific output. The fundamental
challenge time-pressed researcher’s face when evaluating the sci-
entific literature closely resembles the one that consumers in other
domains face—namely, how to filter an unmanageable amount
of information down to only those items that are likely to be
of substantive interest. Currently, scientists address this problem
using heuristics of varying quality, e.g., by focusing on highly-
cited papers that appear in prestigious journals, signing up for
keyword alerts, performing targeted literature searches, and so
on. Such approaches can work well, but they’re time consuming
and effortful. Recommendation systems offer what is, in prin-
ciple, a superior alternative: instead of requiring explicit effort
to identify items of potential interest, the system continuously
mines an accumulated database of article metadata and user
ratings to generate recommendations. Preliminary efforts using
content-based (Dumais and Nielsen, 1992; Basu et al., 2011),
collaborative filtering (Bogers and Van Den Bosch, 2008; Naak
et al., 2009), or hybrid (Torres et al., 2004; Gipp et al., 2009)
approaches demonstrate the viability of automatically generat-
ing article recommendations. However, to date, such efforts have
been conducted on a small scale, and lack an online, publicly
accessible implementation with sufficient appeal to attract a crit-
ical mass of users. Developing an integrated recommendation
system should thus be a major design goal of next-generation
scientific evaluation platforms.
A successfully implemented article recommendation system
would reduce researchers’ reliance on other heuristics of debat-
able utility; for instance, given a system that could accurately
predict which articles a user would find relevant and of high qual-
ity, there would be less need to focus attention on the journals in
which articles were published. The goal of such recommendation
systems wouldn’t be to serve as final arbiter of the quality of
new publications, but simply to filter the literature to a sufficient
degree that researchers could efficiently finish the job. Moreover,
as discussed in the next section, the presence of a recommenda-
tion system would provide a valuable incentive for users to con-
tribute their own evaluations and ratings, enabling an evaluation
platform to grow much more rapidly. Naturally, new concerns
would arise during the course of implementation; for example,
a recommendation system that attempts to identify papers that
users will like risks creating an “echo chamber” where researchers
only receive recommendations for papers that concord with their
existing views (Massa and Avesani, 2007). However, such chal-
lenges should generally have straightforward technical solutions.
For example, the echo chamber effect could be combated by
limiting the weighting of users’ favorability ratings relative to
other criteria such as relevance of content, methodological rigor
(as assessed by the entire userbase), and so on.
A second benefit that highly centralized, open access evalua-
tion platforms would afford is the ability to develop customizable
newmetrics quantifying aspects of scientific performance that are
currently assessed primarily subjectively. Consider, for instance,
the task that confronts academic hiring committees charged with
selecting a candidate from among dozens or hundreds of potential
applicants. Since few if any committee members are likely to have
much expertise in any given applicant’s exact area of research,
hiring decisions are likely to depend on a complex and largely
subjective blend of factors. Is an applicant’s work well respected
by established people in the same field? Does she consistently
produce high-quality work, or are many of her contributions
incremental and designed to pad her CV? Does a middling cita-
tion rate reflect average work, influential work in a small field, or
poor work in a large field? Is the applicant’s work innovative and
risky, or cautious and methodical?
Current metrics don’t answer such questions very well. But
a centralized and automated evaluation platform could support
much more sophisticated quantitative assessment. For instance,
a researcher’s reputation among his or her peers could be
directly quantified using explicit reputation systems (discussed
in the next section) based on thousands of data points rather
than three self-selected letters of recommendation. The nov-
elty or distinctiveness of a researcher’s individual publications
could be assessed using algorithms that evaluate similarity of
content across articles, pattern of citations to and from other
articles, co-authorship, etc., thereby counteracting the pressure
many scientists feel to maximize publication rate even if it
results in redundant publications (Broad, 1981; Jefferson, 1998;
Von Elm et al., 2004). The relative strengths and weaknesses
of a research program could be measured by aggregating over
users’ dimensional ratings of innovation, methodological rigor,
clarity, etc. And all of these metrics could be easily normal-
ized to an appropriate reference sample by automatically select-
ing other authors in the system who works in similar content
areas.
Developing an array of such metrics would be an ambitious
project, of course, and might be beyond the capacity of any sin-
gle organization given that funding for such a venture seems
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likely to come primarily from the public sector. But the public
availability of rich APIs would off-load much of the workload
onto motivated third parties. The recent proliferation of met-
rics such as the h-index (Hirsch, 2005), g-index (Egghe, 2006),
m-index (Bornmann et al., 2008), and dozens of other variants
(Bornmann et al., 2011) is a clear indicator that a large mar-
ket exists for better measures of research performance. But such
metrics are currently based almost entirely on citation counts;
developing a centralized and open platform that supports much
richer forms of evaluation (votes, ratings, reviews, etc.) seems
likely to spur a broader revolution in bibliometrics (cf. Neylon
and Wu, 2009; Lane, 2010; Priem and Hemminger, 2010).
In the longer term, the development of a broad range of evalu-
ation metrics could lead to sophisticated new weighting schemes
optimized for highly specific evaluation purposes. Instead of
relying solely on recommendation systems to identify relevant
articles, researchers would be able to explicitly manipulate the
algorithms that generate summary evaluations of both individ-
ual articles and researchers’ entire output. For instance, a hiring
committee could decide to emphasize metrics assessing innova-
tion and creativity over methodological rigor, or vice versa. An
editorial board at a general interest journal could use metrics
quantifying breadth of interest (e.g., diffusion of positive rat-
ings across researchers from different fields) to select preprints
for “official” publication. Science journalists could preferentially
weight novelty when selecting work to report on. The degree of
customization would be limited only by the sophistication of the
underlying algorithms and the breadth of the available research
metrics.
Providing a high degree of personalization and customizability
wouldn’t completely eliminate subjective criteria from evaluation
decisions, of course—nor should it. But it would minimize the
intensive effort researchers currently invest in filtering the liter-
ature and identifying relevant studies; it would reduce reliance
on evaluation heuristics of questionable utility (e.g., identifying
the quality of papers with the impact factor of journals); and it
would provide objective bases for decisions that currently rely
largely on subjective criteria. In view of the low reliability of clas-
sic peer review, and the pervasive finding that trained human
experts are almost invariably outperformed by relatively simple
actuarial models (Dawes et al., 1989; White, 2006; Hanson and
Morton-Bourgon, 2009), we have every reason to believe that
increasing the level of automation and quantitative measurement
in the evaluation process will pay large dividends. And there is lit-
tle to lose, since researchers would always remain free to fall back
on conventional metrics such as citation rates if they so desired.
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE INCENTIVES
Suppose one implemented a platform with features such as those
described in the preceding sections. Would scientists rush to use
it? Would the database quickly fill up with lengthy reviews and
deep comment threads? Probably not. Technical innovation is
only one part of any novel publishing platform—and arguably
not the most important part. New tools and platforms are often
adopted quite slowly, even when they offer significant technical
advantages over previous approaches. Users signing up for a ser-
vice are generally not interested in what the service could be like
in five years given widespread adoption; they’re interested in the
benefits they can obtain from the service if they start using it
right now.
Many technically advanced platforms that could in principle
enhance scientific communication and evaluation fail to appro-
priately incentivize their potential userbase. Consider the PLoS
platform (http://plos.org), which has long enabled users to rate
and review papers, with the goal of encouraging interaction
between readers and/or authors. In theory, such a platform offers
substantial benefits to the scientific community. If everyone used
it regularly, it would be very easy to tell what other people—
including leading experts in the field—thought about any given
article. Unfortunately, the PLoS platform provides virtually no
incentive to participate, and may even offer disincentives (Neylon
and Wu, 2009; Nielsen, 2009). At present, if I spend an hour or
two writing a critical review of a paper and sign it with my real
name, very few people are likely to read my commentary—and
those who do may well wonder why I’m wasting my time writing
lengthy reviews on open access websites when I could be working
on my own papers. As a consequence, only a small proportion of
PLoS articles have received any comments, and a similar lack of
engagement characterizes most other publishing platforms that
provide a facility for online discussion of manuscripts (Neylon
and Wu, 2009; Gotzsche et al., 2010).
Some critics have seized on the lack of community engage-
ment as evidence of the flaws of a post-publication evaluation
model (Poynder, 2011). But the reason that researchers haven’t
flocked to comment on PLoS articles seems very much like the
reason editors often complain about how hard it is to find peer
reviewers: there simply isn’t any meaningful incentive to con-
tribute. Getting researchers to invest their time building an online
portfolio isn’t only (or even primarily) about providing the oppor-
tunity to engage in online discussion; it’s also about providing
appropriate motivation.
As with many of the other problems discussed above, social
web applications have already addressed—and arguably solved—
the challenge of incentivizing a userbase to participate. Indeed,
virtually every website that relies on user-generated product rat-
ings and reviews faces much the same challenge. For instance,
Netflix’s business model depends partly on its ability to find
you movies that you’ll enjoy. That ability, in turn, depends on
sophisticated quantitative modeling of movie ratings provided by
Netflix users. Without the ratings, Netflix wouldn’t be able to
tell you that you’re likely to enjoy All About My Mother if you
enjoyed Spirited Away. But Netflix users don’t rate movies out
of an abiding respect for Netflix’s bottom line; they rate movies
so that Netflix can give them personalized movie recommenda-
tions. Netflix doesn’t have to ask its users to behave charitably;
it simply appeals directly to their self-interest. Analogous models
are everywhere online: tell Last.fm or Grooveshark which songs
you like, and they’ll tailor the songs they play to your preferences;
buy a product from Amazon, and it’ll try to sell you related prod-
ucts others have bought; upvote a link on reddit and you get to
exert direct (if weak) social influence on the community. Not only
is the long-term goal—whether making money or building an
online community—not emphasized on these websites; it’s largely
invisible.
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A priori, it seems reasonable to expect the same type of model
to work equally well for scientific evaluation. Many scientists
decline invitations to review manuscripts because they can’t spare
a few hours on relatively thankless labor, but few scientists would
be too busy tomake a single 5-point rating after reading a paper—
especially if it doing so helped the system recommend new papers.
The long-term goal of creating a centralized platform for evalu-
ation of scientific manuscripts wouldn’t require much emphasis;
done right, researchers would be happy to use the service simply
as a recommendation engine or bibliography management tool.
More sophisticated features (e.g., separate ratings along dimen-
sions such as impact, innovation, and methodological rigor;
threaded ratings and reviews of other reviews; etc.) could then
be added incrementally without disrupting (and indeed, generally
increasing) the appeal of the core platform.
Notably, at least one popular service—Mendeley (mende-
ley.com)—already appears to be taking precisely this kind of
“passive” approach to community building. Initially billed as
a web-based bibliography management tool, Mendeley recently
introduced a public API that provides access to its data, and has
already begun to add social networking features and statistical
reports that could soon form the basis for a community driven
recommendation system (http://dev.mendeley.com). Crucially,
Mendeley has been able to grow its enormous crowdsourced
database (over 1 million members and 100 million document
uploads as of July, 2011) simply by providing an immediately
valuable service, without ever having to appeal to its users’
altruism. The success of this model demonstrates that the same
principles that have worked wonders for commercial services like
Netflix and Last.fm can be successfully adapted to the world of
scientific evaluation. The challenge lies not so much in getting
users to buy into long-term objectives that benefit the scientific
community as a whole, but rather, in making sure that the short-
term incentives that do drive initial user engagement are naturally
aligned with those longer-term objectives.
REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
Providing short-term incentives such as personalized recommen-
dations can help a platform get off the ground, but in the long
run, building and maintaining an active community is likely to
require additional incentives—ideally, the same ones that already
drive scientific contributions offline. One prominent motivator
is reputation. Currently, the primary mechanisms for building a
reputation in most fields of science are tangible products such
as journal publications, research grants, and conference pre-
sentations. Many other contributions that play essential roles
in driving scientific progress—e.g., peer review, data sharing,
and even informal conversation over drinks—historically haven’t
factored much into scientists’ reputations, presumably because
they’ve been difficult to track objectively. For instance, most sci-
entific articles already include extensive discussion and evaluation
of prior work—the quality of which bears directly on an author’s
reputation—but there is currently no way to formally track such
embedded discussions and credit authors for particularly strong
(or poor) evaluations. The development of new evaluation plat-
forms will make it easy to quantitatively measure, and assign
credit for, such contributions. The emerging challenge will be to
ensure that such platforms also provide sufficient incentives for
researchers to engage in desirable but historically underappreci-
ated behaviors.
Here, again, scientists can learn from the social web. Reputation
systems are at the core of many popular social web communities,
including a number that cater explicitly to scientists. A common
feature of such communities is that users can endorse or rate
other users’ contributions—e.g., indicating whether comments
are helpful, whether product reviews are informative, and so on.
A particularly relevant model is implemented on Stack Exchange
(http://stackexchange.com), a network of over 50 question and
answer sites geared toward professionals in different areas. While
the most popular SE website (Stack Overflow) caters to software
developers, the network also features a number of popular Q&A
sites populated by academic researchers, including mathematics,
statistics, physics, and cognitive science exchanges. A key feature
of the SE platform is the use of a point-based reputation system.
Users receive and award points for questions, answers, and edits
that receive favorable ratings from other users. In addition to
providing an index of each user’s overall contribution to the site,
users attain additional privileges as they gain reputation—e.g.,
the ability to promote, edit, or moderate others’ questions. Thus,
the system incentivizes users to participate in prosocial activities
and penalizes unhelpful or low-quality contributions.
A notable feature of the SE platform is the explicit encourage-
ment for users to post under their real names so as to leverage
(and build) their offline reputations. This is most apparent on
MathOverflow (http://mathoverflow.net), where many promi-
nent users are tenured or tenure-track professors in mathematics-
related fields at major research universities—many at the top
of their fields. The success of this model demonstrates that,
given the right incentives, even busy academics are willing to
engage in online activities that, despite their obvious value to
the community, previously weren’t viewed as creditable scien-
tific contributions. Consider a telling quote from a recent Simons
Foundation article (Klarreich, 2011):
“I have felt the lure of the reputation points,” acknowledges Fields
medalist Timothy Gowers, of Cambridge University. “It’s sort of
silly, but nevertheless I do get a nice warm feeling when my
reputation goes up.”
Prior to the introduction of collaborative platforms like Stack
Exchange, one might have been understandably skeptical of a
famous mathematician revealing that he spends much of his
time accumulating virtual points online (and as of this writing,
Gowers ranks as one of the top 20 users on MathOverflow). But
when the points in question are awarded for prosocial activities
like asking and answering research questions, reviewing others’
work, providing data, writing software, and giving advice, the
scientific community stands to reap large benefits. Moreover, in
addition to incentivizing prosocial contributions, SE-like rep-
utation systems provide at least two other benefits. First, the
reputation scores generated by platforms like Stack Overflow are
themselves valuable in evaluating users’ contribution to the sci-
entific community, since a high reputation score by definition
denotes a user who has made many positive contributions to the
scientific community—mostly through channels that established
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metrics like citation counts don’t adequately assess. Second, the
ability to assign credit for contributions outside the traditional
scope of scientific publication should incentivize contributions
from many people who currently lack the means to contribute
to science in more conventional ways. In particular, trained scien-
tists who work at teaching positions or in non-academic settings
would have a way of contributing in a meaningful and creditable
way to the scientific enterprise even if they lack the time and
resources to produce original research. Thus, carefully designed
reputation systems stand to have a transformative effect on the
communication and evaluation of scientific output.
WHAT HAPPENS TO TRADITIONAL PRE-PUBLICATION
REVIEW?
Supposing new technological platforms do eventually transform
the scientific evaluation process, an important outstanding ques-
tion concerns the role of the traditional, journal-based evaluation
model centered on pre-publication review. What happens to this
model in a world populated by the kind of evaluation plat-
forms envisioned here? Broadly speaking, there are two potential
answers. First, one can envision hybrid evaluation models that
combine the best elements of closed/pre-publication review and
open/post-publication review. For example, one common argu-
ment in favor of pre-publication review is that it improves the
quality of amanuscript prior to its public release (Goodman et al.,
1994). Although the same benefit could arguably be provided
by any platform that allows authors to continually revise their
manuscript in response to post-publication reviews, one could
certainly opt to retain an element of pre-publication review in
an otherwise open platform. A straightforward way to implement
such a system would be to grant authors permission over who can
view a manuscript. In an initial “closed” period, authors would
be free to invite selected peers to perform a closed review of the
manuscript. The feedback received could then be used to revise
the manuscript until the authors were satisfied. The key point is
that the control over when to publish the “official” version of the
manuscript would rest with the authors and not with an editor
(though one might perhaps force authors to stipulate ahead of
time whether or not each review would be made public, ensur-
ing that authors could not suppress negative reviews post hoc). A
major benefit of such an approach is that it would allow diligent
authors to solicit feedback from competing (and likely critical)
researchers, while penalizing less careful authors who rush to
publish without soliciting feedback first. In contrast, under the
current system, recommending critical reviewers is a risky and
generally detrimental proposition.
The second way to answer the “what happens to conventional
review” question is to admit that we don’t really know—and,
more importantly, that we don’t really have to know. If conven-
tional journals and pre-publication review play an indispensable
role in the evaluation process, nothing much should change.
Journals could go on serving exactly the same role they presently
serve. All of the benefits of next-generation platforms discussed
would apply strictly to post-publication review, after the stan-
dard review process has run its course (e.g., a deeply flawed
article that happened to get by the peer review process at a top-
tier journal would be susceptible to immediate and centralized
post-publication critique). There would be no need to expend
effort actively trying to eliminate conventional journals; a well-
designed evaluation platform should be agnostic with respect
to the venue (if any) in which manuscripts originally appear.
Moreover, from a pragmatic standpoint, adoption of new post-
publication evaluation platforms is likely to occur more rapidly
if such platforms are presented as complements to conventional
review rather than as competitors.
That said, it’s easy to see how sophisticated post-publication
evaluation platforms might ultimately obviate any need for con-
ventional journals, and many commentators have argued that
this is a perfectly logical and desirable end result (LaPorte et al.,
1995; Odlyzko, 1995; Delamothe and Smith, 1999; Kingsley, 2007;
Smith, 2010). Once it becomes clear that one can achieve efficient
and reliable evaluation of one’s manuscripts regardless of where
(or whether) they’re officially published, there will be little incen-
tive for authors to pursue a traditional publication route. As a
result, traditional journals may simply disappear over time. But
the important point is that if this process happens, it will happen
organically; nothing about the type of platform proposed here
explicitly constrains the role of journals in any way. To the extent
that traditional journals offer scientists an irreplaceable service,
they will presumably continue to thrive. And if they don’t offer a
valuable service, we shouldn’t mourn their passing.
PUTTING IT INTO PRACTICE
Having reviewed a number of basic design considerations, this
section outlines one possible specification for a post-publication
evaluation platform. In contrast to a number of recent pro-
posals that focus on wholesale restructuring of the scientific
publishing and evaluation process (e.g., Pöschl, 2010; Kravitz and
Baker, 2011; Nosek and Bar-Anan, 2012), the platform described
here focuses exclusively on facilitating centralized, publisher-
independent post-publication review. The platform would exist
independently of the existing pre-publication review system, and
would not require articles to have undergone any prior form of
peer review before being added to the system. Thus, there are
effectively no major technical or legal barriers (e.g., copyright
restrictions) to the immediate implementation of such a platform,
and social barriers are also minimized by presenting the platform
as a complement rather than competitor to traditional models.
A schematic of the proposed platform is provided in Figure 1.
Given that the central argument of this paper is that most of the
principles needed to establish a successful evaluation platform are
already widely implemented on the social web, it should come as
no surprise that the platform described here features few novel
features—it’s essentially a Reddit clone, with a few additional fea-
tures borrowed from other platforms like Stack Exchange, Netflix,
and Amazon. The platform features the following elements (cor-
responding to the circled numbers in Figure 1).
DATA EXTRACTION
The database is initially populated (and continuously updated)
by pulling data from academic search engines and repositories.
For example, many services like PubMed and ArXiv.org provide
API access or free data dumps, ensuring that the evaluation plat-
form can remain up to date without requiring any user input.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of key elements of the proposed
model. (1) Metadata for published or unpublished articles are automatically
extracted from other sources and fed into the platform database. (2) Users
have the ability to rate and/or comment on any article in the database.
(3) Comments are threaded, allowing recursive evaluation. (4) A user’s
reputation reflects their aggregate contribution to the content in the
database, with separate metrics for authorship and commenting. (5) Articles
can be categorized into topics using both automated semantic classification
techniques and manual curation. (6) Retrieved records are ranked based on a
(potentially personalizable) combination of quality, relevance, and recency
criteria. (7) Most of the data in the database can be accessed independently
via API, allowing other parties to create their own evaluation-related
applications. Numbered elements are described in greater detail in the
main text.
The evaluation platform should link to all articles on the origi-
nal publisher/repository website (when available), but should not
take on the responsibility of facilitating access to articles. Articles
that are currently behind a pay-wall would not become publicly
accessible in virtue of having a discussion page on the evalua-
tion platform website; the system would (at least initially) operate
in parallel with the traditional publishing system rather than in
competition.
COLLABORATIVE FILTERING
At the core of the platform is a collaborative filtering approach
that allows any registered user to rate or comment on any article
in the database. These ratings and comments can then used to sort
and rank articles and users in a variety of ways (see below). The
simplest implementation would be a reddit-like voting system
that allows users to upvote or downvote any article in the database
with a single click (Figure 2A). More sophisticated approaches
could include graded ratings—e.g., 5-point responses, like those
used by Amazon or Netflix—or separate rating dimensions such
as methodological rigor, creativity and innovation, substantive
impact, etc., providing users with an immediate snapshot of the
strengths and weaknesses of each article.
THREADED COMMENTING
A key feature of the reddit platform (and many of its precur-
sors, e.g., Slashdot.org) is threaded discussion: users can com-
ment on and rate not only on primary documents (in this case,
scientific articles), but also other comments (Figure 2B). This
feature is vital to the success of a collaborative filtering plat-
form, as it provides a highly efficient corrective mechanism.
For example, it is common on reddit to see one comment’s score
change dramatically in a span of hours in response to additional
comments. This format should translate exceptionally well to the
domain of scientific evaluation, where a single user has the poten-
tial to raise important concerns that other researchers may have
overlooked but can nonetheless appreciate. To encourage authors
to engage with other commenters, one might designate verified
author comments with a special icon (e.g., Figure 2B, orange),
and perhaps provide a small ratings boost to such comments.
REPUTATION SYSTEM
To incentivize users to comment on and review papers (and par-
ticipate in threaded discussions of those reviews), the evaluation
platform should feature a robust reputation system that combines
basic features of the reddit system with additional features found
in the Stack Exchange platform. The reddit system awards users
“karma” points for sharing links and writing comments that are
favorably rated by other users; in the context of a scientific evalua-
tion platform, users would receive points based on ratings of their
contributed articles on the one hand and their comments and
reviews on the other (these commenting and authorship metrics
would be kept separate). Each user’s reputation and a summary of
their contributions would be viewable from the user’s public page.
Standard filtering and search options would be available, allowing
other users to see, e.g., what an individual’s top-rated or newest
articles or comments are.
CATEGORIZATION
Much as reddit features “subreddits” geared toward specific top-
ics and niche interests (e.g., science, cooking, or politics), articles
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FIGURE 2 | Sample web views for a hypothetical “ReviewIt”
post-publication evaluation platform modeled closely on reddit
(http://reddit.com). (A) Ranked listing of top articles tagged with the
“neuroimaging” tag. Each record displays the current number of points (red),
provides upvote/downvote arrows for rating the article, and displays basic
information about the article (authors, journal, etc). (B) Clicking on an article’s
“comments” link takes the user to a discussion page where users can
comment on any aspect of the article or respond to and rate other
comments. Comments with high scores are displayed further up on the
page, increasing their likelihood of influencing evaluation of the article.
in the database would be organized by topic. A core set of top-
ics could be automatically generated based on keywords (e.g.,
the National Library of Medicine’s Medical Subject Heading
[MeSH] ontology); thus, for example, navigating to the /key-
word/neuroimaging subdirectory would display a ranked list of all
articles tagged with the “neuroimaging” keyword (e.g., Figure 2).
Additionally, however, users would be able to create their own
custom topics tailored to more specific niches, much as any reddit
user currently has the ability to create new subreddits. This two-
pronged approach would balance the need for relatively objective
ontologies with manually curated sets of articles (where the role
of curator would be somewhat similar to that of an editor in the
conventional publishing system). An additional benefit of topic-
based organization is that articles published in domains with very
different citation rates and community sizes could be easily nor-
malized and put on a common metric, much as the reddit front
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page currently normalizes scores of links submitted to different
subreddits.
RANKING
For any given set of articles retrieved from the database, a rank-
ing algorithm would be used to dynamically order articles on the
basis of a combination of quality (an article’s aggregate rating in
the system), relevance (using a recommendation system akin to
Netflix or Amazon’s), and recency (newly added articles would
receive a boost). By default, the same algorithm would be used
for all users (as on reddit). However, as discussed above, allow-
ing users to customize the algorithm used to rank articles and/or
weight researchers contributions would greatly increase the util-
ity of the basic platform by enabling individuals or groups with
specific goals to filter articles or users more efficiently (e.g., fac-
ulty search committees with specific needs could rank candidates
based on a customized set of criteria).
API ACCESS
To facilitate community engagement and allow third parties to
use evaluation data in creative new ways, a public API should
be provided that enables programmatic access to nearly all plat-
form data (with the exception of data where privacy is a potential
issue—e.g., individual users’ ratings of individual articles).
Importantly, these features need not all be implemented at
once. In particular, recommendation systems, customizable rank-
ing algorithms, and a public API, while all desirable, could be
added at later stages of implementation once the basic platform
was operational. Of course, many other features not mentioned
here could also be added later—e.g., social networking fea-
tures, integration with third-party evaluation metrics (e.g., total-
impact.org), a closed-review phase that allows users to solicit
reviews privately before an article’s public release, and so on.
CONCLUSION
In the preface to On Spirals, Archimedes amusingly reveals that,
on at least one occasion, he deliberately sent his colleagues in
Alexandria false theorems, “so that those who claim to dis-
cover everything, but produce no proofs of the same, may
be confuted as having pretended to discover the impossible”
(Bombieri, 2011). This age-old concern with being scooped by
other researchers will no doubt be familiar to many contem-
porary scientists. What’s not so easily understandable is why,
in an age of preprint servers, recommendation systems, and
collaborative filters, we continue to employ publication and eval-
uation models that allow such concerns to arise so frequently
in the first place. While healthy competition between groups
may be conducive to scientific progress, delays in the review
and publication process are almost certainly not. Inefficiencies
in our current evaluation practices are visible at every stage of
the process: in the redundancy of writing and re-writing arti-
cles in different formats to meet different journals’ guidelines;
in the difficulty editors face in locating appropriate reviewers;
in the opacity and unreliability of the pre-publication review
process; in the delays imposed by slow reviews and fixed publi-
cation schedules; in limitations on access to published articles;
and in the lack of centralized repositories for post-publication
evaluation of existing work. Almost without exception, effective
technical solutions to these inefficiencies already exist, and are
in widespread use on the social web. And yet, almost without
exception, the scientific community has ignored such solutions in
favor of an antiquated evaluationmodel that dates back hundreds
of years—and in some respects, all the way back to the ancient
Greeks.
To take a long view, one might argue that such inefficiencies
are not the end of the world; after all, science is a cumula-
tive, self-correcting enterprise (Peirce, 1932; Platt, 1964; Popper,
2002). Given sufficient time, false positives work themselves out
of the literature, bad theories are replaced by better ones, and new
methods emerge that turn yesterday’s tour-de-force analysis into
today’s routine lab assay. But while the basic truth of this obser-
vation isn’t in question, it’s also clear that all cumulative efforts
are not equal; the rate at which we collectively arrive at new sci-
entific discoveries counts for something too. Ideally, we’d like to
find cures for diseases, slow the aging process, and build colonies
on extra-solar planets sooner rather than later. Since the rate of
scientific discovery is closely tied to the rate of dissemination and
evaluation of scientific output, the research community has an
enormous incentive—and arguably, a moral duty—to improve
the efficiency and reliability of the scientific evaluation process.
From a utilitarian standpoint, it seems almost certain that even
relatively small increases in the rate of scientific publication and
evaluation would, compounded over time, have far greater soci-
etal benefits than all but a very few original scientific discoveries.
We should act accordingly, and not let inertia, lack of imagina-
tion, or fear of change prevent us from realizing new models of
scientific evaluation that are eminently feasible given present-day
technologies.
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